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AN OUNCE OF PREVENTION: SOLVING SOME
UNFORESEEN PROBLEMS WITH THE
PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO RULE 56 AND
THE FEDERAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT
PROCESS
Adam N. Steinman*

In 1986, the Supreme Court decided three cases-Anderson v. Liberty
Lobby, Celotex v. Catrett, and Matsushita Electric v. Zenith Radio'-that

transformed summary judgment from "a disfavored procedural shortcut ' 2 to
a central feature of federal civil litigation.3 Summary judgment today is so
important that federal courts have cited the three decisions in the 1986 trilogy more frequently than any judicial decisions in the history of American
jurisprudence. 4 For the first time since the trilogy (and indeed since the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure came into effect seventy years ago), the
Civil Rules Advisory Committee has proposed a major revision to Rule
56's summary judgment process.'
Associate
Professor
of
Law,
University
of
Cincinnati
College
of
Law
(http://www.law.uc.edu/faculty/steinman.shtml). Sincere thanks to Alan Morrison, Michael Solimine,
Larry Solum, and Suja Thomas for their helpful comments on earlier drafts.
I See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242 (1986); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317
(1986); Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986).
2 Celotex, 477 U.S. at 327.
3 Whether the Supreme Court's summary judgment trilogy caused this shift or merely ratified one
that had already occurred is an interesting question. See Joe S. Cecil, Rebecca N. Eyre, Dean Miletich
& David Rindskopf, A Quarter Century of Summary Judgment Practice in Six Federal District Courts, 4
J.EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 861, 862 (2007), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=914147 ("[C]hanges

in civil rules and federal case-management practices prior to the trilogy may have been more important
in bringing about changes in summary judgment practice.") (link); see also Gregory P. Joseph, Federal
Litigation Where Did It Go Off Track, LiTIG., Summer 2008, at 132 ("Whether the Summary Judgment
Trilogy is the cause or was an effect, there is no doubt that summary judgment has become a centerpiece
of federal litigation over the past 25 years.").
4 Adam N. Steinman, The IrrepressibleMyth of Celotex: Reconsidering Summary Judgment Burdens Twenty Years After the Trilogy, 63 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 81, 143 (2006).
5 See COMM. ON RULES OF PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE U.S.,

REPORT OF THE CIVIL RULES ADVISORY COMMITTEE 21-40 (May 9, 2008, as amended June 30, 2008)

[hereinafter, COMMITTEE REPORT], available at http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/Reports/CV Report.pdf
(link). The last nontechnical revision to Rule 56 occurred in 1963 and involved fairly minor issues. See
FED. R. Civ. P. 56 advisory committee's notes (1963 Amendment). The public comment period for the
current proposal lasts until February 17, 2009, after which the proposed amendments may be reconsidered or revised. See Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts, PreliminaryDraft of ProposedAmend-
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The aim of the Committee's proposal is laudable: "to improve the procedures for making and opposing summary judgment motions, and to facilitate the judge's work in resolving them."6 It accomplishes this goal by
adopting a "point-counterpoint" process, similar to procedures that have
been used in several federal districts via local rule.7 Under this process, the
summary judgment movant must file a "statement"-separate from the motion and brief-that "concisely identifies in separately numbered paragraphs
only those material facts that cannot be genuinely disputed and entitle the
movant to summary judgment." 8 The nonmovant must then file a "response"-separate from its brief opposing summary judgment-that accepts or disputes each of the facts in the movant's statement, and may also
state "additional material facts that preclude summary judgment."9 The
movant must file a "reply"-separate from its reply brief-that accepts or
disputes any additional facts stated by the nonmovant.10 In proposing this
procedure, the Committee has wisely stated that "no change should be attempted in the summary judgment standard or in the assignment of burdens
between movant and nonmovant," preferring "to leave these matters to continuing evolution under the 1986 Supreme Court decisions that have guided
practice for the last twenty years and more.""
This Essay identifies several problems with the proposed text that
could have unfortunate consequences and contravene the Committee's intent. In particular, the proposed text can be read to make significant
changes to the summary judgment standard and the burdens on litigants at
the summary judgment phase. At the very least, it may inadvertently dictate questionable approaches to aspects of summary judgment procedure
that have yet to be directly addressed by the Supreme Court. Although the
Committee's stated intent to retain the existing standard and burdens might
spur courts to interpret the new text to avoid these ramifications, the safer
ments to the Federal Rules of Practice and Procedure: A Summary for Bench and Bar (August 2008),

available at http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/Reports/Brochure.pdf (link). The Supreme Court must ultimately approve any proposed amendments and transmit them to Congress by May 1, 2009; unless Congress legislates otherwise, any amendments approved by the Supreme Court would take effect on
December 1, 2009. See 28 U.S.C. § 2074(a) (2006).
6 COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 5, at 21.
7 Id. at 25; see also id. at 28-30 (proposed Rule 56(c)(2)). Current Rule 56 contains no particular
procedure for presenting, opposing, and resolving summary judgment motions, see FED. R. CIv. P. 56
(current version), and the Committee notes that this silence has led to local rules that "are not uniform,
and at times mandate practices that are inconsistent from one district to another." COMMITTEE REPORT,
supra note 5, at 21. It is beyond the scope of this Essay to argue the merits of the proposed pointcounterpoint procedure, although I am inclined to agree with the Committee that the process is an improvement that will "encourage well-founded motions and focused responses" and "facilitat[e] wellinformed decision." Id. Rather, the focus of this Essay is to ensure that the process is codified in a way
that does not inadvertently disturb other aspects of summary judgment procedure.
8 Id. at28-29 (proposed Rule 56(c)(2)(A)(ii)).

9 Id. at 29 (proposed Rule 56(c)(2)(B)(i)-(ii)).
10 Id. at 29-30 (proposed Rule 56(c)(2)(C)(i)).
I Id. at 21.
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course is to revise the Committee's proposal before it is officially transmitted in spring 2009. Because the proposed amendments affect so critical an
aspect of civil litigation as summary judgment, an ounce of prevention is
especially well-advised.
Part I of this Essay examines proposed Rule 56(c)(4), which addresses
how parties must support the factual positions they express in their statement, response, and reply. Part II examines proposed Rule 56(c)(5), which
authorizes parties to challenge the admissibility of their opponent's summary judgment material. Part III points out a minor ambiguity in the proposed rule concerning the standard for evaluating additional material facts
asserted in the nonmovant's response. Detailed suggestions for revising the
proposed amendments appear in the Appendix to this Essay.
I.

PROPOSED RULE

56(c)(4): How PARTIES MUST SUPPORT THEIR
FACTUAL POSITIONS

Proposed Rule 56(c)(4) sets forth how litigants must support their factual positions at the summary judgment phase.12 It is a key feature of the
proposed point-counterpoint process, particularly because the court may
confine its inquiry to those "materials called to its attention" under this provision (although it retains authority to consider other materials if it so
chooses).13 There are a number of ways that courts might read proposed
Rule 56(c)(4) as changing the summary
judgment standard and burdens,
14
contrary to the Committee's intent.
As an initial matter, the proposed amendments may inadvertently modify the summary judgment burden that applies to the party (typically the
plaintiff) who will bear the burden of production at trial. The text provides
that parties may support their factual positions by "showing ...that an adverse party cannot produce admissible evidence to support the fact."15 A
plaintiff who bears the burden of production at trial, however, should never
be able to support its factual position simply by showing that the defendant
will not be able to produce admissible evidence to support its view of the
facts. That is precisely the argument that the Supreme Court rejected in Ce12 The proposed text reads:

(A) Supporting Fact Positions. A statement that a fact cannot be genuinely disputed or is genuinely disputed must be supported by:
(i) citation to particular parts of materials in the record, including depositions, documents, electronically stored information, affidavits or declarations, stipulations (including those made for
purposes of the motion only), admissions, interrogatory answers, or other materials; or
(ii) a showing that the materials cited do not establish the absence or presence of a genuine
dispute, or that an adverse party cannot produce admissible evidence to support the fact.
Id. at 30-31 (proposed Rule 56(c)(4)(A)).
13 Id. at 31 (proposed Rule 56(c)(4)(B)).
14 See supra note 11 and accompanying text (describing the Committee's intent that the proposed
amendments leave the existing summary judgment standard and burdens intact).
15 COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 5, at 31 (proposed Rule 56(c)(4)(A)(ii)).
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lotex. If the defendant can show that the plaintiff will lack sufficient evidence to satisfy the plaintiff's burden of production at trial, the defendant
need not "support its motion with affidavits or other similar materials negating the opponent's claim."16
The proposed rule could even allow a plaintiff to support summary
judgment in its favor simply by showing that the defendant "cannot produce
admissible evidence" at trial.17 This would be a drastic change to current
summary judgment burdens. Even if the defendant (who ordinarily does
not bear the burden of production for the elements of a plaintiff's claim)
will have no admissible evidence it can use at trial, the defendant should
prevail as long as the plaintiff fails to meet its burden of production. The
defendant's lack of evidence-standing alone-surely cannot be a sufficient
basis for awarding summary judgment to the plaintiff.
The proposed Advisory Committee Note correctly recognizes that only
a party who does not have the trial burden of production" should be able to
rely on a showing that the adverse party cannot produce admissible evidence at trial.18 This limitation, however, does not appear in the text of the
proposed rule. With so many judicial adherents to textualist methods of interpretation, 19 one cannot be sure that clarifications appearing in the Advisory Committee Note or elsewhere in the drafting history will be an
adequate solution.20
Finally, proposed Rule 56(c)(4) might be read to inadvertently reduce
the burden on defendants who file "no-evidence" summary judgment motions (the kind endorsed in Celotex) that seek to show that the plaintiff will
lack sufficient evidence to meet its burden of production at trial. 1 Under
the Committee's proposal, a movant can support its statement that a fact
cannot be genuinely disputed with either "citation to particular parts of materials in the record" or "a showing ... that an adverse party cannot produce
admissible evidence to support that fact."22 The implication is that a noevidence motion may properly proceed without any citation to materials in
the record. While the proposed rule requires the moving party to make a
16 Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986) (emphasis in original).
17 COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 5, at 31 (proposed Rule 56(c)(4)(A)(ii)).
18 Id. at 37 (emphasis added).
19 See, e.g., Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Servs., Inc., 545 U.S. 546, 568 (2005) ("As we have
repeatedly held, the authoritative statement is the statutory text, not the legislative history or any other

extrinsic material.") (interpreting 28 U.S.C. § 1367).
20 See, e.g., Edward A. Hartnett, Against Mere Restyling, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 155, 167-71
(2006) (expressing concern that courts will "attend to the plain language of the restyled rules" rather
than heed the drafters' intent that the recent restyling was "intended to make no changes in substantive

meaning").
21 Like the Committee Report, this Essay uses the phrase "'no-evidence' motion" to mean a summary judgment motion that is "made by a party who does not have the trial burden of production" and
that "show[s that] the nonmovant has no evidence to support its position." COMMITTEE REPORT, supra

note 5, at 49.
22 Id. at 30-31 (proposed Rule 56(c)(4)(A)).

http://www.law.northwestern.edu/lawreview/colloquy/2008/45/

233

103:230 (2008)

An Ounce of Prevention

"showing" that an adverse party cannot produce admissible evidence, it
would be a substantial change in current practice to suggest that this showing can be made without supporting record materials. Current Rule 56 authorizes summary judgment only where the lack of a genuine issue is
"show[n]" by the record materials. 3 In Celotex, the Supreme Court instructed that even for no-evidence motions, "a party seeking summary
judgment always bears the initial responsibility of ...identifying those portions of 'the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any,' which it believes
demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact."'
Future courts might avoid these consequences, of course, by reading
the proposed rule in conjunction with the Committee's desire not to change
the current summary judgment standard or burdens. But it is far from certain that judges would uniformly choose the uncodified intent of the proposal's drafters over the literal text.25 The best solution, therefore, is to rerestructure proposed Rule 56(c)(4) before it is finalized. Detailed revisions
are suggested in the Appendix to this Essay, but the basic requirements
would be: (1) the summary judgment movant must identify in its statement
the parts of the record on which it relies to show the absence of a genuine
dispute as to any particular fact; and (2) if the nonmovant disputes that fact,
it must identify in its response any additional parts of the record on which it
relies to show the existence of a genuine dispute, or whether it simply believes that the movant's cited materials fail to establish the lack of a genuine dispute. This approach will identify for the court the parts of the
record on which each party relies for each factual issue. Each side's argument as to whether a genuine dispute exists would be left to each side's
summary judgment brief, and would be evaluated under the case law as it
has evolved since the Supreme Court's 1986 trilogy. 6
23 FED. R. CIv. P. 56(c) (current version).

24 Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323 (quoting the then-current version of Rule 56(c)). In 2007, the nonsubstantive restyling of Rule 56 revised the language quoted by the Celotex Court. Current Rule 56(c) allows summary judgment "if the pleadings, the discovery and disclosure materials on file, and any

affidavits show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law." FED. R. CIv. P. 56(c) (current version) (emphasis added).
25 See supra notes 19-20 and accompanying text; see also ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF
INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW 17 (1997) (declaring that government by "unex-

pressed intent" is "tyrannical," comparing it to Emperor Nero's practice of posting edicts high up on pillars so they could not easily be read).
26 The revisions suggested in this Essay's Appendix also eliminate an ambiguity in the proposed
text that could make the "statement" and "response" required under the point-counterpoint procedure
more lengthy and complex than necessary. The Committee Report suggests that each party must make
its "showing" about the presence or absence of a genuine dispute in its separate statement or response.
See COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 5, at 50. Although the Committee stresses that "[tihis showing is

not an argument-arguments are to be made in the brief," id., it is not clear how thorough the showing
in the statement or response must be. If parties perceive a need to include in their summary judgment
statement or response elaborate and lengthy "showing[s]" that essentially duplicate the arguments presented in their briefs, the efficiencies of the point-counterpoint procedure may vanish. This Essay's
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II. PROPOSED RULE

56(c)(5): ADMISSIBILITY OF SUMMARY

JUDGMENT MATERIALS

Another area of concern is a new provision that a party "may state that

material cited [by the opposing party] is not admissible in evidence."27 Perhaps this language is innocuous; authorizing a party to "state" that material
is inadmissible does not necessarily say anything about what sort of evidence is or is not admissible for summary judgment purposes.28 The danger, however, is that the new provision could be read to require that
summary judgment materials satisfy the admissibility standards that govern
at trial. The proposed Advisory Committee Note could even be read to
suggest such a link.29 This issue is particularly important when a defendant
files the kind of "no-evidence" summary judgment motion that the Supreme
Court approved in Celotex. For such motions, the dispositive issue is often
whether the plaintiff will have admissible evidence to support its position at
trial. The concern addressed here is whether the plaintiff's summary judgment materials themselves must be in a form that would be admissible at
trial.
Lower federal courts today are divided on this question,30 and the Supreme Court has never endorsed the idea that summary judgment materials
must satisfy trial admissibility standards. To the contrary, the Court in Celotex stated: "[w]e do not mean that the nonmoving party must produce evidence in a form that would be admissible at trial in order to avoid summary
judgment."3 1 At the summary judgment phase, the inquiry is whether the
nonmoving party's materials, "if reduced to admissible evidence, would be
sufficient to carry [its] burden of proof at trial."32 The test is not whether
the nonmoving party has presented materials that are already admissible
evidence sufficient to carry its burden of proof at trial.
Taken seriously, the idea that summary judgment materials must satisfy trial admissibility standards would make it improper for courts to considsuggested revisions avoid this problem by clarifying that the statement and response need only cite to
any record materials on which the parties rely for their factual positions. This will allow the court to
confine its inquiry to those cited materials, while leaving to the parties' briefs their precise arguments as
to whether a genuine dispute exists.
27 COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 5, at 31 (proposed Rule 56(c)(5)).
28 The Committee Report indicates that the impetus for this proposed language was that practitioners had "asked for explicit direction on the proper formal procedure for presenting the position that material cited to support a fact is not admissible in evidence." Id. at 50.
29 Id. at 37 ("If a case goes to trial, failure to challenge admissibility at the summary-judgment stage
does not forfeit the right to challenge admissibility at trial.").
30 See Steinman, supra note 4, at 121.
31 Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324 (emphasis added).
32 Id. at 327 (emphasis added); see also, e.g., J.F. Feeser, Inc. v. Serv-A-Portion, Inc., 909 F.2d
1524, 1542 (3d Cir. 1990) (citing Celotex); DeBiasi v. Charter County of Wayne, 537 F. Supp. 2d 903,
911-12 (E.D. Mich. 2008) (same); ERBE Electromedizin GmbH v. Canady Tech. LLC, 529 F. Supp. 2d
577, 586-87 (W.D. Pa. 2007) (same); Thomas v. City of Pittsburgh, 34 F. Supp. 2d 965, 969 (W.D. Pa.
1999) (same).
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er sworn affidavits by potential trial witnesses. A party generally could not
use such an affidavit as proof at trial because it would be hearsay-an outof-court statement offered to prove the truth of the matters asserted. 3 Yet
Rule 56 has always contemplated use of such affidavits for summary judgment purposes, to determine whether a genuine dispute indeed exists.34
Indeed, subjecting summary judgment materials to trial admissibility
standards may fundamentally misperceive how evidentiary rules apply to
the summary judgment inquiry. An out-of-court statement might be inadmissible hearsay if offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted in that
statement, 35 but at the summary judgment phase the nonmovant does not
need to prove the truth of the matter asserted; she need only show that a genuine dispute exists for trial. If a party indicates an intent to call at trial the
individual who made the out-of-court statement-and thus shows that what
would otherwise be hearsay can be "reduced to admissible evidence"-then
36
that statement is surely relevant to whether there is a genuine dispute. Of
course, the material must be capable of being "reduced" to admissible evidence. If the only witness who might testify to a particular fact at trial is
deceased, or incompetent, or barred from testifying due to a privilege or
33 See FED. R. EVID. 801(c) (defining hearsay as "a statement, other than one made by the declarant
while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted").
Unlike testimony at a deposition, where there is an opportunity to cross-examine the declarant, statements in an affidavit are generally not covered by any exception to the hearsay rule. Cf FED. R. EvID.
804(b)(1) (providing that prior testimony given at a hearing or deposition should not be excluded as
hearsay if the declarant is unavailable and "if the party against whom the testimony is now offered... had an opportunity and similar motive to develop the testimony by direct, cross, or redirect examination"); FED. R. CIv. P. 32(a)(1)(A) (providing that depositions may be used against a party at trial
only if "the party was present or represented at the taking of the deposition or had reasonable notice of
it").

34 The Committee appears to recognize this tension in the "Detailed Discussion and Questions" portion of its Report, although the language it uses is somewhat ambiguous. The proposed rule lists the
types of evidence that may be considered at the summary judgment phase, namely "depositions, documents, electronically stored information, affidavits or declarations, stipulations (including those made
for purposes of the motion only), admissions, interrogatory answers, or other materials." COMMITTEE
REPORT, supra note 5, at 30 (proposed Rule 56(c)(4)(A)(i) (emphasis added)). Discussing this provision, the Report explains that "[iut is important to carry forward the familiar authority to rely on affidavits or declarations because they otherwise might be excluded from consideration as inadmissible at
trial." Id. at 50 (emphasis added). The italicized language suggests that summary judgment evidence
might indeed be "excluded from consideration" if it would be "inadmissible at trial." The Committee
seems to presume, however, that the mere inclusion of affidavits in the list of summary judgment materials solves what "otherwise" would be an inadmissibility problem. But if the types of evidence enumerated in Rule 56 are per se admissible for summary judgment purposes, then it is unclear what would
ever be a valid basis for "stat[ing]" under Proposed Rule 56(c)(5) that material cited by the other side "is
not admissible in evidence."
35 See FED. R. EvID. 801(c).
36 A court might not be able to predict with mechanical certainty whether information reflected in a
summary judgment document will in fact be reduced to admissible evidence at trial. But this is so even
with the gold-standard of summary judgment material-a sworn affidavit from a witness with personal
knowledge of the relevant facts. For any number of reasons, that witness might testify differently at trial
or might not be able to appear at all. See Steinman, supra note 4, at 141-42.
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other testimonial bar, then material reflecting what the witness's trial testi-

mony might have been could not create a genuine dispute. The reason,
however, is not that such material is inadmissible for summary judgment
purposes. The reason is that it would be impossible to reduce that material
to admissible evidence at trial and, accordingly, such material cannot show
that a genuine dispute exists.37

Proposed Rule 56(c)(5) should be eliminated. Rule 56 has never contained general language regarding whether particular summary judgment
materials are "admissible in evidence." 38 Adding a provision that could be
read to impose admissibility requirements that defy the Supreme Court's
explicit language in Celotex would contravene the Committee's guiding
principle that any change to the existing summary judgment standard or
burdens should be left "to continuing evolution under the 1986 Supreme
Court decisions that have guided practice for the last twenty years and
more."3 9 Because the use of trial admissibility standards at the summary
judgment phase is an open question under the current version of Rule 56,4"

37 See Steinman, supra note 4, at 128-31. The analysis above focuses on materials used
to rebut a

Celotex-style "no evidence" motion. Trial admissibility standards may play a more direct role when the
movant (whether plaintiff or defendant) seeks summary judgment based on affirmative evidence that its
factual position is true, for example, by submitting material showing that the traffic light was in fact red
or green when the defendant's car entered the intersection. In this situation, the movant is using that material "to prove the truth of the matter asserted," FED. R. EvID. 801(c), because such a movant satisfies
the summary judgment standard only by establishing the truth of the matter beyond any genuine dispute.
Yet even in this context, current practice does not fully incorporate trial admissibility standards. As discussed supra notes 33-34 and accompanying text, affidavits are routinely used for summary judgment
purposes, even though they are generally not admissible at trial. Perhaps evidentiary flaws in the movant's material are more suitably resolved by the summary judgment standard itself, rather than by a
separate inquiry into whether the material is "admissible" for summary judgment purposes. Imagine
that a movant presents no sworn testimony by witnesses with personal knowledge of what color the traffic light was, but seeks summary judgment based on a deposition where the deponent testifies that
someone else had said that the light was green. Even if the court may permissibly consider this testimony for summary judgment purposes, the hearsay problem may mean that the movant has failed to truly
"foreclose the possibility" of a genuine dispute and, therefore, has not met the summary judgment standard. Cf. Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 157 (1970) (holding that affidavits from two of the
defendant's employees stating that they had not conspired with any policemen to refuse service to the
plaintiff were insufficient bases for summary judgment because the affidavits "fail[ed] to foreclose the
possibility that there was a policeman in the Kress store ... and that this policeman reached an understanding with some [other] Kress employee that [the plaintiff] not be served"). It is beyond the scope of
this Essay to exhaustively explore the role of trial admissibility standards in different summary judgment
situations; for this Essay's purpose, it is sufficient to note that significant open questions remain.
38 COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 5, at 31 (proposed Rule 56(c)(5)). Rule 56 has always required
that affidavits (but not other summary judgment materials) "must be made on personal knowledge, set
out facts that would be admissible in evidence, and show that the affiant is competent to testify on the
matters stated." FED. R. CIv. P. 56(e) (current version). This language regarding affidavits has been retained in the Committee's proposal. See Committee Report, supra note 5, at 31-32 (proposed Rule
56(c)(6)).
39 COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 5, at 21.
40 See Steinman, supra note 4, at 121.
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the safer course is to leave Rule 56 silent on the admissibility issue (as it
always has been).41
III. ASSESSING ADDITIONAL MATERIAL FACTS IDENTIFIED BY THE
NONMOVANT

One minor concern is how the proposed "point-counterpoint" procedure operates when the nonmovant identifies additional facts in response to
a summary judgment motion. Whereas the proposed rule states explicitly
that the movant may assert "only those material facts that cannot be genuinely disputed," the rule does not address the standard for evaluating
"additional material facts" asserted by the nonmovant.4 2 Because summary
judgment is proper only when "there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact, 4 3 a nonmovant's additional fact should be accepted for summary
judgment purposes as long as there is at least a genuine dispute about
whether the fact is true. Whether that fact indeed precludes summary
judgment will depend on the circumstances of the case, but the fact cannot
be ignored unless there can be no genuine dispute that the fact is false. To
avoid confusion on this issue, the proposed rule should explicitly recognize
the standard for evaluating additional facts asserted by the nonmovant.
Suggested revisions are set forth in the Appendix.
CONCLUSION

The potential problems with the proposed amendments to Rule 56 can
be fixed with fairly modest redrafting. There may be other ways to address
these concerns; the specific revisions suggested in the Appendix are but one
possible approach. The goal of this Essay is simply to bring these concerns
to the forefront, and to thereby encourage further consideration by the Advisory Committee and the legal community before the amendments come
into effect. The Committee is to be commended for its excellent work on
the proposed amendments, as well as its conscientious efforts to solicit
comment from the legal community in accordance with the Rules Enabling
Act.' When it comes to a crucial issue like the summary judgment process,
close vetting of proposed textual changes is essential to avoid the needless,
costly, and time-consuming uncertainty that might otherwise result.

41 Eliminating proposed Rule 56(c)(5) would not prevent a litigant from arguing that her opponent's
summary judgment material is inadmissible. Such an argument could be raised in her summary judg-

ment brief (or reply brief).
42 COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 5, at 29 (proposed Rule 56(c)(2)(B)(ii), authorizing the nonmovant to state "additional material facts that preclude summary judgment").
43 Id. at 27 (proposed Rule 56(a) (emphasis added)); accordFED R. CIv. P. 56(c) (current version,
authorizing summary judgment when "there is no genuine issue as to any material fact").
44 See 28 U.S.C. § 2073; see also supra note 5.
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APPENDIX

Following are suggested revisions to the Proposed Amendments to
Rule 56 circulated by the Civil Rules Advisory Committee in its Report of
May 9, 2008, as supplemented June 30, 2008. Suggested additions to the
Committee's proposal are marked in underline font. Suggested deletions
are marked in st4kethough font. The suggested revisions are directed at
sections (a) and (c) of the Committee's proposal.

Proposed Rule 56(a): Motion for Summary Judgment or Partial Summary Judgment. A party may move for summary judgment on all or part
of a claim or defense. The court should grant summary judgment if the materials in the record-including depositions, documents, electronically
stored information, affidavits or declarations, stipulations (including those
made for purposes of the motion only), admissions, interrogatory answers,
or other materials* show that there is no genuine dispute as to any material
fact and a party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. The court should
state on the record the reasons for granting or denying the motion.
Proposed Rule 56(c): Procedures.
(1) Case-Specific Procedure. The procedures in this subdivision (c) apply unless the court orders otherwise in the case.
(2) Motion, Statement, and Brief; Response and Brief; Reply and Brief.
(A) Motion, Statement, and Brief The movant must simultaneously file:
(i) a motion that identifies each claim or defense-or the part of each
claim or defense-on which summary judgment is sought;
(ii) a separate statement that concisely identifies in separately numbered
paragraphs only those material facts that cannot be genuinely disputed
and entitle the movant to summary judgment; and
(iii) a brief of its contentions on the law or facts.

(B) Response and Brief by the Opposing Party. A party opposing summary
judgment:

This listing of materials is taken verbatim from proposed Rule 56(c)(4)(A)(i). The list is moved
here in light of this Essay's suggested revisions to proposed Rule 56(c)(4). This suggested approach
parallels current Rule 56, which explicitly links the enumerated summary judgment materials with the
general summary judgment standard. See FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c) (current version) ("The judgment sought
should be rendered if the pleadings, the discovery and disclosure materials on file, and any affidavits
show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as

a matter of law.").
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(i) must file a response that, in correspondingly numbered paragraphs,
accepts or disputes-or accepts in part or disputes in part-each fact in
the movant's statement;
(ii) may in the response concisely identify in separately numbered paragraphs additional material facts as to which there is at least a genuine
dispute that preclude summary judgment; and
(iii) must file a brief of its contentions on the law or facts.
(C) Reply and Brief The movant:
(i) must file in the for- required by Rule 5 )
(, a reply that in
correspondingly numbered paragraphs, accepts or rejects-or accepts in
part and rejects in part-4eony each additional facts stated by the non
e-ai+n opposing party under rule 56(c)(2)(B)(ii); and
(ii) may file a reply brief.
(3) Accept or Dispute Generally or for Purposes of Motion Only. A party
may accept or dispute a fact either generally or for purposes of the motion only.
(4) Citing Support for Statements or Disputes of Fact; MaterialsNot Cited.-

(A) Supporting the Movant's Statements of Fact. For each fact the movant
identifies in its Rule 56(c)(2)(A)(ii) statement, the statement must cite to
particular parts of materials in the record that show the absence of a genuine
dispute as to this fact.
(B) Disputing the Movant's Statements of Fact. For each fact that the opposing party's response disputes-or
56(c)(2)(B)(i), the response must either:

disputes

in part-under

Rule

(i) assert that the materials cited in the movant's statement fail to establish the absence of a genuine dispute as to this fact; or

This Essay's suggested sub-sections (A)-(D) of Rule 56(c)(4) would replace the Committee's
proposed Rule 56(c)(4)(A), which reads:
(A) SupportingFact Positions. A statement that a fact cannot be genuinely disputed or is genuinely disputed must be supported by:
(i) citation to particular parts of materials in the record, including depositions, documents, electronically stored information, affidavits or declarations, stipulations (including those made for
purposes of the motion only), admissions, interrogatory answers, or other materials; or
(ii) a showing that the materials cited do not establish the absence or presence of a genuine dis-

pute, or that an adverse party cannot produce admissible evidence to support the fact.
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(ii) cite to particular parts of materials in the record that show the presence of a genuine dispute as to this fact: or
(iii) both (i) and (ii).
(C) Supporting the Opposing Party's Additional Statements of Fact. For
each additional fact that the opposing party identifies under Rule
56(c)(2)(B)(ii), the response must cite to particular parts of materials in the
record that show that there is at least a genuine dispute as to this fact.
(D) Disputing the Opposing Party's Additional Statements of Fact. For
each additional fact that the movant rejects-or rejects in part-under Rule
56(c)(2)(C)(i), the movant's reply must either:
(i) assert that the materials cited in the opposing party's response fail to
establish that there is at least a genuine dispute as to that fact: or
(ii) cite to particular parts of materials in the record that show that there
is no genuine dispute that this fact is false: or
(iii) both (i) and (ii).

(T-E} Materials Not Cited. The court need consider only materials called
to its attention under Rule 56(c)(4)(A) _(_, but it may consider other materials in the record:
(i) to establish a genuine dispute of fact; or
(ii) to grant summary judgment if it gives notice under Rule 56(f).

(5) Assertion that Fact is Noet Suppoed by Admissible Evidence. A r-esponte
or- reply to a statemfenit of fact mfay State tat;_ teh- maeilcitePd to_support or
dbspute the fact is not adwsible in evidence.
(}(5) Affidavits or Declarations. An affidavit or declaration used to support a
motion, response, or reply must be made on personal knowledge, set out facts
that would be admissible in evidence, and show that the affiant or declarant is
competent to testify on the matters stated.
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